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THE DOCTRINE OR 
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE IN 
MINERAL CONVEYANCING
Professor Phillip E. Norvell
THE DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE  
AND M INERAL CONVEYANCING
By
Professor Phillip Norvell
University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville)
I. The Common Law Doctrine o f Estoppel by Deed
If a conveyance purports to transfer a certain estate, whether this appears from 
recitals, covenants, or any other part of the instrument, the grantor is estopped 
thereafter to assert that, by reason of his lack of title at the time, such an estate did 
not pass by the conveyance -  to assert, in other words, that he acquired title after 
and not before the conveyance. 4 Tiffany Real Property § 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
II. The Modern Strands o f the Common Law7 Doctrine
A. Estoppel by Misrepresentation (Estoppel in Pais).
The grantor, having induced a change of position on the part of the 
grantee, the payment of purchase money, by his representation that 
he has an estate of a certain character, is thereafter estopped to 
deny that the conveyance passed the estate which it purported to 
pass, but also that the conveyance actually passes, by way of 
estoppel, any estate or title which the grantor may after acquire in 
the land. Id.
B. Estoppel by Representation.
The grantor recites in a deed, typically without covenants of title, a 
fact that represents that the grantor then has an interest to convey.
The grantor is estopped by the representation to assert the after- 
acquired title.
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See, Hagensick v. Castor. 73 N.W. 932 (Neb. 1898), where a 
grantor recited in a quitclaim deed that the grantor “being one of 
the three heirs of George H. Ohler" quitclaimed and conveyed the 
land to the grantee. In fact, George H. Ohler, although missing, 
was not then dead. He died later and the court held that the after- 
acquired title passed under the deed because the recital represented 
that the grantor then had an interest to convey.
C. Covenants of Title and Avoiding Circuitry- of Action.
Although generalizations are difficult to make in this area, the 
primary doctrine that typically applies in the US is the estoppel by 
deed based on covenants of title, particularly the covenant of 
warranty. 4 Tiffany Real Property § 1230 (3d ed. 1939). The 
doctrine is usually premised on the theory of avoiding circuitry- of 
action, giving the after-acquired title to the grantee instead of 
relegating him to sue for damages on the grantor's covenant of 
warranty. Id- The other traditional covenants of title general ly 
found in the warranty deed, the covenant of seisin, right to convey, 
quiet enjoyment and further assurances, have been used by courts 
in other jurisdictions as a basis for the applying the doctrine of 
after-acquired title. 6 American Law Property §15.19 (1952).
III. The Doctrine of After-Acquired Title in Arkansas
A. The After-Acquired Title Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-601.
“If any person shall convey any real estate by deed purporting to 
convey it in fee simple absolute, or any less estate, and shall not at 
the time of the conveyance have the legal estate in the lands, but 
shall afterwards acquire it, then the legal or equitable estate 
afterwards acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee and the 
conveyance shall be valid as if the legal or equi table estate had 
been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance."
B. The Warranty Deed/Quitclaim Deed Distinction.
i. After-Acquired Title in Arkansas is based on the Covenant of 
Warranty.
The covenant of warranty is the basis for vesting the 
grantor's after-acquired title in the grantee.
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Thus, the doctrine is inapplicable to quitclaim deeds.
Holmes v. Countiss. 115 S.W.2d 553 (Ark. 1938) See also 
cases cited in Note, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired Title 
in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 67, 71 n. 43.
ii. The covenant o f warranty is implied by statute when 
the words ‘‘grant, bargain and sell” appear in the 
granting clause.
The Arkansas Statutory Short Form Warranty Deed, Ark Code Ann 
§ 18-12- 102(b), implies the traditional covenants o f title in a deed 
if  the granting clause utilizes die words “grant, bargain and sell.” 
Such a deed will convey after-acquired title. However, because the 
statute is construed literally, the granting clause must contain the 
precise language “grant, bargain and sale.” See, Chavis v. Hill. 
224 S. W.2d 808 (Ark. 1949), holding a deed that contained the 
language “grant, bargain, sell, convey and quit claim” in the 
granting clause did not convey after-acquired title because it failed 
to comport with the statute. But see, Graham v. Quarles. 176 
S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ark. 1944) wherein the Arkansas Supreme Court 
held that a granting clause containing the language “grant, bargain, 
sell and convey” imported a covenant o f warranty into the deed 
pursuant to the statute.
iii. Limitations on the warranty deed/quitclaim deed distinctions; the 
intent o f the grantor versus the form of the deed.
The form of the deed is not necessarily controlling as to the 
whether the doctrine applies. In Bradley Lumber. Co. v. 
Burbridue.Co., 210 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. 1948), a quitclaim 
deed was held to convey the after-acquired title because it 
contained a recital that the grantor conveyed “all o f its 
interest, present and prospective.” Contrarily, in a deed that 
imported the implied warranty o f title pursuant to the 
statutory short form warranty deed act did not convey after- 
acquired title due to the recital that the grantor was only 
conveying “all my right title and interest” to the land. See,
Note, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired 
Title in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 67, 71.
The Arkansas Supreme Court typically frames the 
issue in these cases as to whether the deed is a
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quitclaim or a warranty deed, with the latter deed 
only conveying after-acquired title. Graham v,
Quarles. 176 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ark. 1944).
However, scrutiny o f  the cases reveals that the 
underlying test, ultimately founded on the intent o f  
the parties, is simply whether the deed conveyed or 
attempted to convey the land or only conveyed or 
attempted to convey the grantor’s presently owned 
interest (or property acquired from a specific 
source). See, Bradley Lumber. Co. v.
Burbridge.Co., 210 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Ark. 1948). 
Additionally, see, Richard W. Hemingway, After- 
Acquired Title in Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 97,121 (1966).
C. The Operation of Estoppel by Deed
i. The doctrine o f after-acquired title only applies 
when the grantor conveys or attempts to convey, but 
fails to convey an interest in land.
The Statute only affects interests in land which the 
grantor has conveyed or which his deed purports to 
convey. It does not affect an interest afterwards 
acquired by the grantor, which he has not previously 
conveyed or attempted to convey. Wells v. Chase.
88 S .W .1030, 1031 (Ark. 1905).
ii. The after-acquired title passes automatically, Eo Instante, 
to the grantee.
Haves v. Coates. 238 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1951). 
adopts, as a rule o f  property, the “automatic 
vesting’’ theory in which the title automatically vests 
in the grantee at the very moment that it is 
subsequently acquired by the grantor. Under this 
theory, the grantee does not have to do anything to 
obtain the after-acquired title. Arkansas in Lewis v. 
Bush. 283 S.W. 377 (Ark. 1926). overruled by 
implication in Coates, had previously applied the 
implied trust theory in which the grantor holds the 
subsequently acquired legal title in trust for the 
equitable beneficiary grantee. Justice George Smith 
authored the dissenting opinion which was joined
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by two other justices. According to the implied 
trust theory, as espoused by Justice Smith, the 
grantee may have to bring specific performance 
against the grantor to obtain the legal title to the 
after-acquired and, also, may lose his rights by 
laches or other equitable defenses. Id. at 936.
Title examiners like the automatic vesting theory 
because the grantee can be determined to have 
marketable title to the after-acquired interest solely 
from the record title. No curative efforts are 
required as to the interest. Critics o f the automatic 
vesting theory lament the fact that it denies to the 
grantee the option o f suing on the covenant o f  
warranty, as opposed to suing to establish title to the 
after-acquired interest. For a full discussion o f the 
Arkansas cases, see Note, Estoppel to Assert an 
After Acquired Title in Arkansas. 17 Ark. L. Rev.
67 ,74 -76.
iii The doctrine o f inurement (feeding the estoppel).
The doctrine o f  after-acquired title not only operates in 
favor o f the grantee but for the benefit o f her successors-in- 
interest and, also, not only binds the grantor but the 
successors-in-interest o f the grantor. 6 American Law 
Property §15.21 (1952). The inurement o f the doctrine o f  
after-acquired title to the benefit o f those in privity with the 
grantee, along with the automatic vesting theory, permit 
feeding the estoppel, i.e., allowing the ownership to be fed  
down the chain o f title from the grantee to the current 
owners o f the record title interest. The combination o f the 
automatic vesting theory and the doctrine o f  inurement 
have prejudiced the equities o f subsequent purchasers. See, 
Osceola Land Co. v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co.. 103 
S.W. 609 (Ark. 1907). For a persuasive criticism that 
Osceola Land does not follow' the better view, see 2 Walsh. 
Commentaries on the Law o f Real Property § 221 (1947).
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iv Mechanical application o f the doctrine can lead to inequities.
The doctrine o f after-acquired title applies to a 
spouse who joins the warranty deed in order to 
waive dower or homestead. See, the case o f the poor 
widow Robertson, Robertson v. Griffin. 302 
S.W.2d 773 (Ar. 1957).
iii. The unusual application: the two deed scenario (or where the 
grantee was the grantor in the prior overconveying deed).
In Garvin v. Mack Oil Co., 39 P3d.775 (Okla. 2001), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the doctrine o f 
after-acquired title to a subsequent deed between the 
same parties where the grantee was the grantor in the 
prior overconveying deed. The result in Mack Oil 
Co. is better illustrated by an examination o f the 
facts in the case. All the deeds involved were mineral 
deeds containing covenants o f warranty. Feagin 
originally owned 40 mineral acres in the land 
involved. In 1927, Feagin conveyed 26.667 mineral 
acres to Garvin and Gant. Then, in 1928, Feagin, 
owning only 13.333 mineral acres, purported to 
convey 20 mineral acres to McCaughev. Title failed 
in McCaughey's deed as to 6.667 mineral acres.
Thereafter, in a 1929 deed, McCaughey purported to 
convey 10 mineral acres back to Feagin. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, applying the doctrine o f  
after-acquired title to McCaughey’s 1929 deed back 
to Feagin, deducted from that grant the 6.667 mineral 
acre deficiency that existed in Feagin’s 1928 deed to 
McCaughev. Thus, by his 1929 deed, Feagin only 
acquired 3.33 mineral acres though it purported to 
convey 10 mineral acres.
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